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PROCEEDINGS 
(Court called to order at 2:41 p.m.) 
THE CLERK: Civil Action 96-1564, Kenneth 
Zeran versus America Online., Incorporated. 
Counsel, please note your appearances. 
3 
1 
2 
3 
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THE COURT: All right, who is here on behalf 
7 of the plaintiff? 
8 ATTORNEY EDWARDS: Your Honor, I am John 
9 Edwards. I am a member of the Bar of this Court. With me 
10 is Leo Leo Kayser, for whom I would like to make a motion 
11 that he be admitted for purposes of this case. 
12 He is a member of the Bar of the State of 
13 New York, the Second Circuit, the District of Columbia, 
14 and the United States District Court. I would offer his 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 . 
admission for purposes of this case. 
THE COURT: The motion pro hac to have Mr. 
Kayser appear on behalf of the defendant is granted. 
We are glad · to have you here, Mr. Kayser. 
ATTORNEY KAYSER: Thank you, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Who is here for the defendant? 
ATTORNEY KLINE: Your Honor, Sara Kline, and 
I would like to introduce Patrick Carome, for whom the 
motion has already been granted. 
THE COURT: All right. Who will argue 
25 today? 
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ATTORNEY CAROME: I will, your Honor, 
Patrick Carome for America Online. 
THE COURT: We are glad to have you here, 
Mr. Carome. 
4 
You may be seated. I will tell you where I 
stand. 
First of all, let me be clear, Mr. Edwards 
fax filings are not permitted. I found pages missing in 
the filings. And fax filings, 'however, aren't permitted 
in the courthouse. You will have to comply. 
"Local counsel" typically means local. 
Roanoke is not terribly local, but I am going to permit 
, 
13 it. But if there is a hardship that results, it will fall 
14 on the plaintiff. In the future, you may not file 
15 anything by fax. 
16 RECAPITULATION BY THE COURT 
17 THE COURT: The matter is before · the Court 
18 on the defendant's motion to dismiss or motion for 
19 judgment on the pleadings. The motion is based on the 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
application of ~he Communications Decency Act, which the 
defendant contends is applicable to the facts of this 
case. 
This case comes here on transfer from the 
Western District of Oklahoma, and the issues raised 
involve the application of Section 230 of the 
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Communications Decency Act and also on whether, even if 
applicable, the allegation of a negligence cause of action 
in some way avoids the application of the statute. 
Mr. Carome, let me hear from you first. You 
might -- and I think you should focus to some extent, 
although you may argue whatever issues you think need 
7 emphasis, but you should focus on those two, principally, 
8 namely the application of the statute and whether the 
9 statute, even if applicable, would stand in the way of a 
10 negligence suit. 
11 ATTORNEY CAROME: Thank you, your Honor. 
12 ARGUMENT BY THE DEFENDANT 
13 ATTORNEY CAROME: I believe that the briefs 
14 have crystallized two issues. The first issue is whether 
15 or not Mr. Zeran's suit is one to treat America Online as 
16 the publisher or speaker on information posted on America 
17 Online interacted on by a third person. The Section 230 
18 of the Communications Decency Act mainly prohibits any 
19 treatment of America Online as the publisher or speaker of 
20 such third-party --
21 THE COURT: He says -- you ought to focus on 
22 what he said. He says this doesn't speak to them as a 
23 publisher or speaker. It seeks to hold them as a 
24 distributor. 
25 ATTORNEY CAROME: I think there are three 
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respects, your Honor, in which Mr. Zeran's suit treats 
America Online as the publ1'sher of th' 1rd-party content. 
6 
First, such a suit, regardless of how it is 
labeled, seeks to put America Online in precisely the same 
legal position as the original publisher of these messages 
could be put in a defamation suit or any other suit for 
harm arising out of this content. 
The original publisher is obviously the 
publisher. To threat America Online legally identically 
in terms of damages imposed, would be to treat America 
Online as the publisher of the third-party content. 
Secondly, it is well-settled under the 
common law throughout this country that liability for harm 
caused by defamatory statements -- and that's what we have 
here, we have allegedly defamatory, bogus statements 
that suits for such harms are only properly brought 
against parties who are treated as publishers. 
Here, clearly, to hold America Online 
responsible for damages caused by third-party posted 
messages would do exactly what your typical defamation 
suit would do. 
Thirdly, the duties that Mr. Zeran's suit 
seeks to impose on America Online are the quintessential 
activities of a publisher. He seeks to have America 
Online, whenever there is any defamatory message posted on 
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the system by a third party, be under a duty, once told of 
that situation, first to publish some form of reaction or 
notice --
THE COURT: Let me ask you this: Does the 
5 Communications Decency Act bar any action against an 
6 electronic type, like AOL, if the facts were that on one 
7 of their bulletin boards, some libelous or some defamatory 
8 words were published, and they were advised that they were 
9 false and defamatory, and they knew they were false and 
10 defamatory, and they didn't remove them? 
11 ATTORNEY CAROME: Yes. The Communications 
12 Decency Act bars such liability. Liability in that 
13 circumstance treats America Online as the publisher of 
14 that content. 
15 THE COURT: Treats them as a publisher? 
16 ATTORNEY CAROME: Yes. 
17 
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THE COURT: So they would be liable. 
ATTORNEY CAROME: They would not be liable, 
because to hold them liable in those circumstances would 
treat them as a publisher, which is barred by Section 230. 
THE COURT: Even after they are told that it 
is defamatory and they know that it's defamatory, let's 
say there are documents and admissions, and they 
nonetheless do it? 
ATTORNEY CAROME: That is exactly right. 
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That is exactly what Congress has provided. 
THE COURT: Now, where do you see that in 
either the language or in any of the history of the 
statute? 
ATTORNEY CAROME: Well, your Honor, as I 
indicated, to impose liabilities in those circumstances 
8 
, 
your Honor, would mean that every time there was a 
complaint against America Online, someone brings to its 
attention a complaint about content on its system, it 
would have to essentially have a legion of investigators 
on hand to investigate that complaint, just as a newspaper 
would. 
13 THE COURT: But a newspaper does have 
14 responsibility. 
15 ATTORNEY CAROME: That is absolutely right. 
16 And a newspaper is -- when you sue a newspaper for the 
17 content in the newspaper, you have treated that newspaper 
18 as the publisher of that content. And when -- and that's 
19 perfectly permissible as to a newspaper. 
20 However, a suit 
21 - THE COURT: If you substituted a newspaper 
22 for America Online in the hypothetical I gave you, there 
23 probably would be liability. 
24 ATTORNEY CAROME: Absolutely, your Honor. 
25 It is very clear that section 230 was intended to 
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eliminate liability for entities such as America Online. 
2 The act provides for --
3 
4 
THE COURT: Now, let's suppose that instead 
of something appearing on America Online about some or one 
5 
of their subscribers, that America Online decided for one 
6 
reason for another to defame somebody and started putting 
7 stuff on. Is there any liability? 
B ATTORNEY CAROME: Yes, there potentially 
9 would be liability, your Honor, because __ 
10 THE COURT: Why? 
11 ATTORNEY CAROME: That would not be 
12 Section 230 states that no provider or user of an 
13 interactive computer service -- that is, America Online 
14 shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any 
~ 
15 information provided by another --
16 THE COURT: Is this received by another? 
17 ATTORNEY CAROME: -- by another contact 
18 provider. This is a circumstance of your hypothetical 
19 which would not have been information provided by another 
20 information content provider. 
21 THE COURT: All right, address briefly the 
22 application of the Act, in view of the Act. I understand 
23 your argument that the Act would -- or construing the Act 
24 not to cover events prior to the effective date of the 
25 Act, would render, would render meaningless the statement 
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1 that no liability would be imposed. 
2 ATTORNEY CAROME·. Y es. Your Honor, are you 
3 
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5 
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7 
8 
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asking me to address what the plaintiff refers to as the 
retroactivity issue? 
THE COURT: Yes. 
ATTORNEY CAROME: Under the leading case 
here, which obviously is the Supreme Court's decision in 
Land Graph, it specifies a two-part analysis in 
determining the --
THE COURT: start with the language of the 
11 statute. This statute now became effective 
12 ATTORNEY CAROME.: On February 8, 1996 • 
13 THE COURT: And these events all took place 
14 prior to the effective date, although the suit was filed, 
15 of course, long after the effective date, and the statute 
16 itself, 230, states that no cause of action may be 
17 brought -- and you say that's the end of the matter, 
18 because this was a cause of action brought afterwards. 
19 But then you go on to say that the fact that 
20 no liability may be imposed underscores the fact that the 
21 activities don't have to occur after the effective date of 
22 the statute, or that language would be meaningless. 
23 
ATTORNEY CAROME: That is absolutely 
24 correct, your Honor. 
25 
THE COURT: And then you go through the 
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Land Graph -- why is there any -- are there any decisions 
considering this? 
3 It would seem that the Stratton/Oakmont 
4 [phonetic] case --
5 ATTORNEY CAROME: The Stratton/Oakmont case, 
6 which predated --
7 THE COURT: The Prodigy case. 
8 ATTORNEY CAROME: That's correct, your 
9 Honor. 
10 THE COURT: There is no authority, I take 
11 it, considering whether Section 230(c) should apply to 
12 cases brought after the ~ffective date of the act, but 
13 involving activities that occurred prior to the act. 
14 ATTORNEY CAROME: Yes. There is, as a 
15 matter of fact, there is a point --
16 THE COURT: Let's go back for a moment --
17 because it's late in the afternoon, and you'll have an 
18 opportunity for rebuttal because you have the burden. 
19 - There is obviously, you say, a creative 
20 litigant. That's -meant to be pejorative. It' is 
21 complimentary, that is how the law regards it in this 
22 country, that is, creative lawyers and excessively 
23 creative lawyers and judges. 
---. fa ' But in any event, they are framing it as a 
25 negligence claim. And your response to that I understand, 
MICHAEL A. RODRIQUEZ, RPR/CM/RMR 
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1 but give me some authority where there has been, this 
2 particular point has been raised; in other words, where 
3 there has been some immunity for publishing and the effort 
4 to circumvent that has been to frame it in negligence 
5 terms. Is that the Molday [phonetic] case? 
6 ATTORNEY CAROME: The cases that we 
7 discussed at pages 13 and 14 of our main brief, including 
8 Hustler versus Falwell and the Molday case, are examples 
9 of cases where plaintiffs have sought to avoid the 
10 protections of publisher liability by trying to plead a 
11 case as negligence, or negligent infliction of emotional 
12 distress. 
13 The courts in those cases have uniformly 
14 recognized that when a plaintiff 
15 THE COURT: Just a moment. You are going to 
16 have to be quiet at counsel table. I can hear it up here. 
17 
18 
Go ahead. 
ATTORNEY CAROME: Thank you, your Honor. 
19 The cases recognize that if the protection 
20 is against defamation liability, which defamation 
21 liability is a cause of action for the negligent 
22 publishing of false and harmful information, if that tort 
23 could -- and the protections also that go with it could be 
24 avoided simply by pleading just a straight negligence case 
25 or a negligent infliction of emotional distress case, then 
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1 every single defamation would easily be converted into a 
2 straight negligence action, with none of the panoply of 
3 protection that this Court has recognized for that sort of 
4 publishing liability. 
5 If that could be done in this case, that 
6 simply by relabeling the cause of action as one for simple 
7 negligence and cause for negligent distribution, then 
8 there would be no protection in section 230 for, for 
9 precisely this sort of situation. 
10 Congress clearly intended to remove from 
11 interactive service providers --
12 THE COURT: That is a conclusion that is 
13 something I have to determine. 
14 Let me ask you this: Plaintiffs obviously, 
15 plaintiff obviously relies quite heavily on the Cubby 
16 case, the duty to screen case. Surely that case, having 
17 been decided in '91, would have found some mention or 
18 reference in the legislative history or argument in the 
19 Congress. Did you find that? 
20 ATTORNEY CAROME: There is no reference, 
21 your Honor, in the legislative history, as far as I know, 
22 of the Cubby case. The legislative history says that the, 
23 one of the purposes of the statute is to overturn Prodigy 
24 and similar cases. 
25 Prodigy is the only other case that I am 
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aware of, and it has been cited to the Court, in which an 
online service provider has been held liable for the 
tortious content put on its service by a third party. 
Congress certainly was intending to remove 
the burden of such liability from online services when 
. they are acting in this intermediary capacity, as in this 
case. 
And speaking of Cubby, there is no possible 
way to draw out of Gubby ~his notion of a tort of 
negligent distribution. In fact, I am not aware of any 
case which holds --
THE COURT: All right, tell me about Cubby. 
13 It's New York Law. 
14 ATTORNEY CAROME: Cubby was New York Law. 
15 There were three causes of action that were plead. Mr. 
16 Kayser was counsel for Cubby, as I understand it. 
17 The first cause of action was for 
18 defamation, and the Court framed -- which defamation 
19 treats the defendant as a publisher, because pUblication 
20 is one of the first and foremost elements of any 
21 defamation claim. 
22 The Court said in that case that the 
23 question that the Cubby case presented was whether or not 
24 the rule that one who repeats a defamatory statement is 
25 liable as if he originally published it, should apply in 
MICHAEL A. RODRIQUEZ, RPR/CM/RMR 
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1 the circumstances. 
2 Cubby, there were also tort for -- I am 
3 going to forget for this disparagement, and there is 
4 another similar tort in each of the three torts. 
5 The Cubby Court made clear that CompuServe, 
6 the defendant in that case, could be held liable if there 
7 were facts establishing that it was the publisher. 
S What Mr. Kayser has done, through his 
9 creativity, is to suggest that a special protection which 
10 the Cubby Court applied for computer contributors, namely 
11 the protection rooted in the First Amendment, for, that no 
12 defamation liability can be imposed, or other liabilities 
13 for third-party contact can be imposed on a distributor, 
14 absent knowledge or reason to know of the defamation. 
15 That simply was a special protection rooted in the 
16 Constitution for a distributor. 
17 But it was a -- if that protection was 
18 overcome in any case, it was only to apply to the 
19 defamation tort, which would treat the defendant as a 
20 publisher, as quintessentially the defamation tort, which 
21 was the leading tort at issue in the Cubby versus 
22 CompuServe case. 
23 It just completely stands Cubby on its head 
24 to read out of it some new tort of negligent distribution. 
25 That isn't the case tort which treat intermediaries as 
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1 responsible for the harm caused by a third person's 
2 speech, or by defamation torts which treat the 
3 intermediary as the publisher. And for that reason, this 
4 notion of a negligent distribution basis for, as liable 
5 that, that can't change the application of Section 230 to 
6 this case. 
7 And if it could, Section 230 would have 
8 absolutely no meaning, which clearly you say is a 
9 conclusion. But I think one cannot draw anything from 
10 both the legislative history and, even more importantly, 
11 the findings and policy that are expressly stated in 
12 Section 230, that Congress clearly intended to remove from 
13 interactive service providers the risk of liability when 
14 they are acting -- the risk of liability for the content 
15 posted on their service by third parties. 
16 It is clear, for example, from Section 230, 
17 Part (b), which is the policy statement, it is the policy 
18 of the united States to promote the continued development 
19 of the Internet and other interactive computer services, 
20 and other acts of intermedia, to provide the computer, 
21 that presently exist for the Internet and other 
22 interactive computer services undeterred by federal or 
23 state legislation. 
24 Here, and lastly Congress doesn't --
25 Congress does not ignore the fact that there was a serious 
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issue, a serious policy issue concerning harmful content 
that is transmitted over the Internet or interactive 
service providers. 
17 
That is why in the last of the policy 
statements of Section 230, Congress reaches out and says 
that it is the policy of the United States to insure 
vigorous enforcement of federal criminal laws to deter and 
punish -- to deter and punish trafficking in obscenity, 
stalking and harassment by means of computer. 
Here, Congress made a fundamental choice 
this is a very exciting, still in infancy, technology, 
that is revolutionizing the way computers are 
communicating in the united States and the world. 
Congress did want to remove from the 
participants, the intermediary participants, in that 
revolution the risk of liability for third-party content. 
And Congress coincidentally also said, and 
indicated by this last policy statement, that the way to 
deal ·with this problem of harm caused by third-party 
content is to go after the harassers and the stalkers and 
the others who are posting harmful content directly, but 
to not burden the Internet and the interactive service 
providers with liability for third-party content. 
THE COURT: All right, thank you. 
Mr. Kayser? 
MICHAEL A. RODRIQUEZ, RPR/CM/RMR 
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ARGUMENT BY THE PLAINTIFF 1 
~ ATTORNEY KAYSER: May it please the Court, I 
3 would like to address the Court on the substantive issues 
4 with respect to Section 230. And I don't know if the 
5 Court permits, but if it does, Mr. Edwards would talk 
6 about the retroactivity issue to the Court. 
7 The legislative history of Section 230 is 
8 best summarized in this conference agreement, which is not 
9 in either brief, but which I have a copy here and I would 
10 like to read. 
11 THE COURT: It must be some sign of its 
12 relevance that it's not in either brief. 
13 ATTORNEY KAYSER: I didn't have it, your 
14 Honor, before. 
15 The conference agreement adopts the House 
16 provision with my modification as a new Section 230 of the 
17 Communications Act. This section provides good Samaritan 
18 protection from civil liability for providers or users of 
19 an interactive computer service for actions to restrict or 
20 to enable restriction of access to objectionable online 
21 material. 
22 THE COURT: Doesn't that just say that if 
23 you do take steps to screen, you wouldn't be held 
24 responsible 
25 ATTORNEY KAYSER: Exactly. 
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THE COURT: for doing it negligently? 
It doesn't say you have to take screening 
efforts. It says if you do, you wouldn't be penalized for 
trying to do it. 
ATTORNEY KAYSER: That is exactly it, that 
is correct. It was done in the wake of the Cubby case and 
the Stratton/Oakmont case. 
The next sentence is one of the specific 
purposes of this section to overrule the Stratton/Oakmont 
against Prodigy and any other similar decisions, which 
have treated such providers and users as publishers and 
speakers of content. 
That is not -- this is not their own, 
because they restricted access to objectionable material. 
This provision was adopted knowing about the Cubby, Inc., 
CompuServe case, which is also cited with approval, where 
Stratton/Oakmont applied the provision that if you had 
knowledge, then you would be deemed a publisher if you 
actually took action. 
What this legislation did was to encourage 
the service provider to take action after notice, or 
before if they chose to; but in either event would not be 
deemed to be a publisher or speaker, as Stratton/Oakmont 
had so held. 
And other than that, that is what Section 
MICHAEL A. RODRIQUEZ, RPR/CM/RMR 
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1 230 does. 
2 THE COURT: I don't think there is any 
3 disagreement from the defendant on that. 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
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ATTORNEY KAYSER: Well, the defendant goes 
further and says that Section 230 does more than that, and 
says that any content at any time, provided exempted by, I 
think, America Online itself, for example, no matter what, 
how damaging it might be, and it does not limit it to 
defamation. 
This case is not just a defamation case. 
11 The telephone number of the plaintiff was used. If that 
12 telephone number had been blocked out -- it actually goes 
13 directly to a direct privacy issue -- then these phone 
14 calls that have threatened his life couldn't have happened 
15 in the wake of what did occur here. 
16 And in fact, the action, part of the action 
17 that was asked to be taken, to actually block out and 
18 screen his phone calls --
19 THE COURT: The only claim made here is the 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
negligence claim. There is no claim made here other than 
negligence. It may be that you are saying something other 
than damage, but the only claim made is negligence. 
ATTORNEY KAYSER: That is correct. And the 
claim is limited simply to the fact that they should 
have -- that America Online should have known that they 
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should have had a compilation team in place, standard of 
care, they had a duty. 
21 
They already know they had a duty to take 
care of situations which may arise with respect to 
incendiary, dangerous information that could have 
threatened someone's life in this case, or appear to 
threaten someone's life, where there were death threats, 
where they would be in a position to do something with 
that content, glean it out in some way, after notice. 
Nothing had to be done before that. Section 
230 requires notice to do that, and not deem them the 
publisher. This is a duty imposed upon them in the 
capacity as distributor. 
The cases that the defendant cites to claim 
that this is publisher liability that is being sought, are 
some common law cases, for example, a bartender who didn't 
remove graffiti in a bathroom after notice, things of that 
nature, which then deemed it to be a pUblication of --
that is out of the common law court. 
It was not in the context of construing a 
statute which modifies the common law. And the old adage 
that statute should be strictly construed when it comes to 
modification of common law doctrine, wasn't being applied 
in that case. 
So, a court would not be looking at the 
MICHAEL A. RODRIQUEZ, RPR/CM/RMR 
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1 effect of negligence -- just common law negligence is what 
2 we are talking about here, your Honor -- as to whether or 
3 not there would be some other operation that had to be 
4 taken into account, some other term to be used to do 
5 justice in the case. 
6 So, those cases did not have something to 
7 look at in terms of doing justice, in terms of assessing 
8 or attaching responsibility. 
9 There were a couple other points in terms of 
10 assistance to the Court in the construction of section 
11 230. There is another section to the statute, which is 
12 cited in the brief of the plaintiff, in opposition, which 
13 is Section 223. 
14 There was no response to this argument that 
15 was in the defendant's brief, and I think for good reason. 
16 It expressly provides that when a service provider is in a 
17 position to control content, and is -- presumably, if it 
18 is brought to its attention it should be in such control, 
19 could be in such control, then liability can attach. 
20 And so there is clearly not a blanket 
21 exemption for whatever content can be on the system at any 
22 time, with no exceptions, which is basically the argument 
23 that is being advanced by the defendant. 
24 This basically concludes my presentation to 
25 the Court on this issue, your Honor. 
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THE COURT: All right. Thank you, Mr. 
Kayser. 
Mr. Edwards? 
FURTHER ARGUMENT BY THE PLAINTIFF 
ATTORNEY EDWARDS: On the question of 
retroactivity, the parting point for the analysis of 
whether a statute is retroactive or not is the landmark 
Land Graph case, which is a 1994 case, I believe. And 
there, the Supreme Court basically enunciated construction 
that there is a strong presumption of prospective 
applic~tion of statutes, just like case law, of course, 
have retroactive application. 
But this is a strong presumption of 
prospective application because of the fairness doctrine, 
basically. And it's only when Congress establishes a 
clear expression of legislative intent that it be 
retroactive, and only when also it doesn't conflict with 
the Constitution, such as protection -- protected rights 
of the Constitution, that then could the courts say that a 
substantive law would have retroactive application. 
Now, the rule with regard to procedure 
matters is somewhat different, because there can be an 
implication in case of statute of limitations and other 
procedural matters that don't apply in this particular 
case. 
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1 The defendant in this case hangs its hat on 
2 Section 230 language, which says no cause of action may be 
3 brought and no liability may be imposed under any state or 
4 local law that is inconsistent with this section. 
S That has nothing whatsoever to do with 
6 retroactivity. That has to do with the supremacy clause, 
7 the preemption of state and local laws that differ, that 
8 are inconsistent from this section. That's all that had 
9 to do with it. It has nothing whatsoever to do with 
10 proactive or prospective. 
11 THE COURT: Would the common law principle 
12 that you are seeking to have applied here, that is 
13 negligence, be a state or local law? 
14 ATTORNEY EDWARDS: The common law would 
15 be --
16 THE COURT: A law, if it is inconsistent, 
17 would apply, wouldn't it? 
18 ATTORNEY EDWARDS: If it were inconsistent 
19 after the Act becomes effective. But in this case, the 
20 Act, I am saying, does not even apply to Section 230, the 
21 Communications Decency Act does not apply to the facts of 
22 this case, because it didn't go into effect until some 
23 eight months or so after the events which occurred here. 
24 If the Court rules that the Communications 
25 Decency Act is not retroactive in application, then 
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Section 230 and all these other arguments simply don't 
apply at all. 
In effect, I guess, in some ways we are 
getting the cart before the horse. The question could 
well be: Does it have retroactive application? 
25 
And if the answer is "No," as we contend it 
is only prospective, then that decides the case. 
You can also turn it the other way around 
and say Section 230 does not limit the negligence claim 
that has been brought here, because of distribution 
11 liability, and that's in the analysis as well. You can do 
12 it either way. 
13 
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You can do it, is what I am saying, in the 
Land Graph case, where there was -- that, of course, was 
an interpretation of the 1991 act, amendment to Title 7. 
And from the language in the statute, it 
said that the amendment would have application to pending 
cases, and even there the Court said it was not 
retroactive. 
Here, there is nothing like that at all. 
There is nothing in this Communications Decency Act that 
would suggest that Congress had any intention to make it 
retroactive at all. 
Since it didn't go into effect until 
February 1996, and the acts that the cause of action grew 
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out of in this case were in April or May of 1995, it is 
clear that we have a statute here that has no application 
whatsoever to this case. Nor is there any reason to upset 
the common law in this case with regard to distribution 
liability. 
As I mentioned earlier, it is only in the 
cases, I believe, that were cited by the defendant in his 
8 brief, where there was retroactive application, that was a 
9 procedural and jurisdictional matter, and not subjective 
10 
11 
matter. 
I think the Land Graph case actually bases 
12 the burden of proving, of arguing that a statute has 
13 retroactive application by looking to clear language in 
14 the statute, and there is none in this case to suggest 
15 that Congress intended for it to have retroactive 
16 application. 
17 I would be happy to answer any questions. 
18 otherwise, I would close my argument. Basically, since 
19 
20 
21 
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there is no expression of legislative intent to make it 
retroactive, it can't be retroactive. 
THE COURT: Mr. Carome? 
ATTORNEY CAROME: Thank you, your Honor. 
ARGUMENT BY THE DEFENDANT 
THE COURT: What about Section 2231 
ATTORNEY CAROME: section 223 does not alter 
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the analysis at all. First, I wili point out that Section 
230 itself -- excuse me -- specifically says that it has 
no effect .on -- I am referring to Section 230(d)(1) -- no 
4 effect on criminal law. It says: 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
"Nothing in this section shall be 
construed to impair the enforcement of Section 
223 of this Act ... 
What I submit, your Honor, is that Section 
223 is an extremely narrow criminal statute directed at 
particular obscene and indecent communications, and that I 
don't agree with Mr. Kayser's treatment of it. 
But in any event, even if there is some 
tension between the treatment of an interactive service 
provider in 223 and the provision that there can be no 
treatment of an interactive service provider as a provider 
of third-party content, that tension was perhaps 
recognized by Congress and it specifically said that there 
would be -- that section 223 would override the effect of 
Section 230, perhaps, but only in that very limited 
criminal circumstance. 
And so to suggest that 223 suggests some 
sort of different treatment of an interactive service 
provider, which we certainly do not intend to suggest that 
it does, is irrelevant to an interpretation of Section 
230, because Section 230 specifically says that it has 
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nothing to do with Section 223 liability. 1 
2 
3 
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THE COURT: Address very briefly, then, the 
Land Graph argument. 
ATTORNEY CAROME: There are two steps to the 
5 Land Graph argument. First, you look to see whether 
6 Congress has expressly provided for the temporal reach of 
7 the statute. 
8 Our position is, and I think it is clear, 
9 that the statutory language, no cause of action may be 
10 brought and no liability brought that is inconsistent with 
11 this section. 
12 That language is, could not be any clearer, 
13 that it prohibits the imposition in any c~se from that day 
14 forward that's inconsistent with Section 230. To achieve 
15 Mr. Zeran's construction, you have to read into that 
16 provision an exception which would say, "Except for cases 
17 where the cause of action had already accrued before 
18 enactment of this action, no cause may be brought and no 
19 liability be imposed. Obviously, there is no such 
20 exception in the language of the statute. 
21 I would invite the CoUrt's attention to a 
22 case that I didn't, frankly, notice, when we did our reply 
23 brief, and that I feel helps us substantially on this 
24 expressed language point, which is the Lynn v. Murphy 
25 case, which says -- which is a case that Mr. Zeran 
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incorrectly cited as going the other way. 
That case held that when there is language 
in a statute that is of a prohibition in nature and 
clearly nothing is more clearly a prohibition, "no 
liability is imposed" -- then that such language should 
apply to all cases brought after that date. 
Similarly, Lynn says that normally when the 
language of a statute speaks to the power of a court --
and here, clearly, the language that "no liability may be 
imposed" -- speaks to the power of a court, that such 
language also is properly and expressly understood as 
applying to all cases from that date forward. 
Alternatively, even if you didn't agree with 
the proposition that the statute was expressed on this 
point, you would still have to then go through the Land 
Graph analysis as to whether or not, applying Section 230 
to preenactment events, would have a retroactive effect. 
And that is a term of art, that's not at all the way 
opposing counsel has used that term. 
Land Graph says a statute does not operate 
retroactively merely because it is applied in a case 
arising from preenactment conduct. Rather, you have -to 
23 look at the effect of the statute. And there is a 
24 three-part test. 
25 Does the statute increase a party's 
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1 liability for past conduct? is first. 
2 Second, does it impose new duties with 
3 respect to transactions already completed? 
4 Or third, does it impair rights a party 
5 possess when he acted? 
6 The first two tests clearly have no 
7 applicability here. Section 230 does not increase a 
8 party's liabilities for past conduct, nor does it impose 
9 new duties on anyone. 
10 So, the only question under Land Graph then 
11 is whether -- and this is as to whether there is a 
12 retroactive effect -- is whether application of section 
13 230 to preenactment conduct would impair rights a party 
14 possessed when he acted. 
15 I submit that it is clear that this statute 
16 and its application to preenactment events clearly doesn't 
17 do that. It's clear that Mr. Zeran took no action 
18 whatsoever in reliance on some assumed right to sue 
19 America Online. 
20 In these circumstances, the rug was not 
21 pulled out from under him in any respect, other than that 
22 he went and hired an attorney and prepared a lawsuit. 
23 Clearly, that's not an impairment of a right a party 
24 possessed when he acted. 
25 In addition, the notion that there is some 
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settled right here that any parties had to sue an online 
provider in these circumstances is a complete fallacy. 
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Neither of my respected opposing counsel has 
suggested a single case, other than Cubby -- which I say 
they have completely misconstrued -- that posed an action 
of negligent distribution to an online service provider. 
And that's not surprising, because we are 
still in a state where this is the infancy of this 
communications medium, and the law is just barely 
beginning to address it. 
So, the notion there are settled rights the 
parties have in that context, I would submit is clearly 
wrong. 
Lastly, the Supreme Court in Land Graph 
indicated that this question of impairment of rights a 
party possessed when he acted is not -- that also is a 
term of art, which has in mind vested rights. And there 
is a long line of cases which we have cited at pages 18 
and 19 of our reply brief, which states it is well-settled 
that a prospective or even a pending tort action does not 
constitute a vested right. 
If the Court has no further questions, I 
will conclude. 
THE COURT: Well, it's page 20, and not 18 
and 19. 
MICHAEL A. RODRIQUEZ, RPR/CM/RMR 
---------- ---
1 ATTORNEY CAROME: I'm sorry. 
2 THE COURT: It's an interesting .point. It 
3 is somewhat novel. I am going to write on the subject 
4 fairly promptly and I will take the matter under 
5 
6 
advisement. 
I thank counsel for their cooperation. I 
7 will write on it chiefly because it is novel. 
S All right, I thank counsel. You may call 
9 the last matter. 
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10 (Court adjourned in Zeran v. America Online) 
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